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In this paper we will outline the fate of ius naturale in Russia up to the early 20th century, then we will introduce the outstanding personality of Konstantin Pobedonostsev and his magnum opus -the Course on Civil Law, and finally we will examine the legacy of natural law in this Course.
I. Natural Law in Russia before 1917
The idea of natural law underwent a long evolution in Russia in two different traditionsthe Orthodox and the classical Western European. The Orthodox tradition, starting with the christianization of Rus' in 988 under the Byzantine influence, was the leading ideological force in Russia until the reforms of Peter the Great in the early 18th century. The idea of natural law existed in the frame of religious dichotomy of the ever just God's grace and often unjust human laws. This dichotomy was contemplated by the Orthodox clerics and heretics mostly with religious and moral aims in mind. Moreover, the sources on the subject are scarce.
Metropolitan Ilarion of Kiev was probably the first author in Kievan Rus' to articulate the dichotomy of positive law and higher religious standard through the notions of 'truth' vs 'statute' ('pravda' vs 'zakon') in his treaty "A word on zakon and God's grace' (mid 11th century). This was not a legal treaty in the modern sense but rather a commentary on the Christian doctrine intended for Kievan princes. 4 In the following centuries the concept of a higher moral and religious standard was actively invoked by several heretics, such as Strigolniki, the sect of Skhariya the Jew (14th to early 16th century), Nil Sorsky (1433-1508), Maksim Grek (mid 16th century), Feodosij Kosoj (mid 16th century) and others 5 . These monks or clerics envisaged natural law as a reflection or embodiment of Christian truths in nature and human life which should prevail over all positive laws. Some scholars argue that this was the first articulated thesis about the supremacy of a higher law over positive laws in Russian history, which paved the way for a distinct branch of legal though, even of the innate and inalienable rights of man. 6 However, from the 16th to 18th centuries these visions of natural law did not produce any legal literature.
Jurisprudence as a distinct branch of knowledge began to take shape in Russia under the influence of the Western European classical natural law starting from the reign of Peter the Great 4 For more details and literature see: http://www.pravenc.ru/text/389115.html 5 For more information on this subject see: Zolotukhina N., Development of Russian medieval political and legal thought, Moscow, 1985 (in Russian); Momotov V., Formation of Russian medieval law in the 9th to the 14th centuries, Moscow, 2003 (in Russian) . 6 Zolotukhina N., Op. cit. n. 2, p. 76.
5 popularity of the Historical School under the leadership of F.C. von Savigny in Germany 14 and the critical assessment of the classical natural law by Russian scholars. 15 In the Age of the Great Reforms (1860-70s) under Alexander II (1855-1881) Russian judicature was substantially westernized. The four Regulations of 1864 introduced such staple principles of modern European judicature as judicial monopoly on law enforcement, the principle of equality of the parties involved; public hearings, jury trial; and the institution of a professional advocate. To support these institutional changes, some efforts were made to modernize, or in fact to establish a proper national jurisprudence, including that of the civil law. 16 All this happened under the decisive influence of the German Pandectists, advocating the study of positive law instead of the abstract ideas of natural law.
Only in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries did Russian legal thought experience a revival of natural law as a response to, and critique of, the dominant legal positivism.
Contemporary scholars tend to explain this phenomenon by means of a combination of reasons, including a consolidation of the schools of thought in Western Europe, the popular support of the reforms in Russia, the formation of civil society, the rise of social consciousness, and an intensified struggle between social groups. In their attempt to challenge the monopoly of legal positivism, the leaders of the revived school of natural law (Pavel Novgorodsev, Evgeny Trubetskoy) argued for an absolute social ideal or standard which could not and should not be reduced to a specific historical period and, thus, prevented any attempts to pursue specific unrealistic ideals.
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However, the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 put an end to any speculations in the field of natural law, along with the development of jurisprudence along Western models. Petersburg in 1835 with the mission to prepare young Russian noblemen for public services.
Legal education was at the core of its curriculum which was based on the ideas of German Historical School. 
Introducing Pobedonostsev's Course on Civil Law
Pobedonostsev's unique practical experience, academic creed, accompanied by diligence and persistence, allowed him to design and accomplish the first comprehensive dogmatic course on Russian civil law. It took him more than two decades to publish his magnum opus -"Property rights" (vol. 1, 1868), "Family law and succession law" (vol. 2, 1871), "Contracts and obligations" (vol. 3, 1880), all three were published in St. Petersburg, including the complete three volume set in 1896.
On the occasion of Pobenonostsev's death in 1907 the newspaper "Russia" wrote that his
Course on Civil Law firmly established Russian national jurisprudence of civil law, since all previous literature on this subject either plainly echoed Western European publications or narrated civil laws without due explanations or lamely adopted European general theories of civil law.
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Professor of civil and commercial law Gabriel Shershenevich praised Pobedonostsev's ability to maintain and reason his own independent interpretation of the civil laws, and compared him with Roman lawyers, known for their unwillingness to generalize or to give broad definitions, for their outstanding accuracy in describing case circumstances and consistency in resolving legal issues on the basis of the established tradition.
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The Course on Civil Law was praised by practitioners of law and quickly became a work of authority in Russian courts, including the Governing Senate of the Russian Empire. Therefore, it gave an accurate image of the predominant doctrines of Russian civil law towards the end of the 19th century.
However, the Course on Civil Law was criticised for neglecting legal theory. 26 At first sight this critique seems to be justified by the structure and the mode of treatment adopted in the Course. Few parts of the voluminous work were intended to expound the author's academic creed and mode of treatment whereas extensive commentaries on the Digest of Laws and the decisions of the high courts were ubiquitous and often followed its logic. At the same time, the Course did not lack the implied theoretical basis with historical and comparative methodology at its core. This methodology, basically, reflected Pobedonostsev's academic creed, as stated above. In the introduction to the Course, he clearly indicated his intention to prepare a dogmatic 9 work with a comprehensive exposition of the basic matters of civil law by comparing Roman, French, German laws in order to give the reader a full picture of the legal matter under examination before moving on to expose the corresponding provisions of Russian positive laws.
The latter were treated through the prism of their historical development.
This combination of dogmatic, comparative and historical methods, in Pobedonostsev view, should enable any reader to see similarities and differences, correspondences and discrepancies between Russian and Western European laws. 27 In addition, such an approach should facilitate the gap filling and critique of Russian positive laws (i.e. the Digest of Laws)
which Pobedonostsev regularly reprimanded for their general inconsistency, multiple out-of-date regulations, and lacunas.
In the first volume of his Course, Pobedonostsev did not explain the root of these defects, but in the introduction to the third volume he mentioned the lack of 'classical' legal knowledge ('classical foundations') at the time Russian laws were drafted and enacted. are not always capable of or willing to give a comprehensive exposition of the legacy they benefit from. By the second half of the 19th century the heritage of classical natural law was ideologically and methodologically discredited as a rebellious and abstract theory which did not take into account historical experience. So, most lawyers were not willing to give it credit.
Second, the European legal tradition in the 19th century was neither a stub nor an invention of the Historical School and the Pandectists but rather an amalgam of the long term development.
The legacy of classical natural law was undoubtedly an important and fairly recent part of this process which was sufficiently absorbed into mainstream European jurisprudence through legal education and codification.
According to the leading German specialist in the history of European private law, 
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Even a brief review of Pobedonostsev's Course on Civil Law reveals unmistakable parallels with the legacy of classical natural law which the author largely disliked and denied.
Even more resemblance can be found in matters of contract law. In comparison with personal status, family or succession matters, this branch of law is justly believed to be less attached to a particular nation or a period in history and, hence, more appropriate for transplanting abroad.
III. Contractual doctrine in general Systematic arrangement of contract
In Pobedonostsev's Course contract law was recognized as one of the major sub-branches of civil law within the law of obligations. He proposed a two-fold grouping of obligations according to the mode they arise, bilateral (contracts) and unilateral (delicts and all other modes). 34 The scholar intended to simplify the divisions accepted in Prussian, French, and
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Austrian legislations and correct the inconsistency of Russian Digest of Laws. In a sense this is an attempt to return to summa divisio of obligations arising from contracts and delicts in classical Gaius' Institutes (3.88).
However, the result was not convincing. In fact, Pobedonostsev dismissed the more sophisticated schemes in Roman 35 , or Pandectist, or natural 36 , and proposed a division of obligations which was unbalanced in favour of contracts. More than 94 percent of the third volume of the Course is dedicated to contracts, and the general part of the law of obligations turned out to be a general part of contract law.
Necessity and significance of contracts
According to Pobedonostsev, legal obligation is necessary in any society because of the need for certainty of a claim that it gives to a creditor. Such certainty is required for reaching legal goals a creditor could not achieve on his own. 37 All contracts aim at increasing one's economic power with the help of another through the legal constraint of another's will. 38 Assuming that the lawyer alluded to the natural weakness of humans, the whole explanation turns out to be almost an exact match to the major argument of the adherents of classical natural law in favour of contracts. 39 The significance of contracts in all times was attributed to the unifying effect of voluntary agreements unlike property law, which divided people. By mid-19th century contracts became the most elaborated domain of civil law. All property, things, and values were in constant circulation. In the words of Pobedonostsev, acquiring them was no longer an end in itself but rather a means to acquire new things and values, often through contracts. 40 This trend should justify such close attention to contractual obligations at the expense of other modes of obligation.
Definition and essence of contract
Following the demonstrative method Pobedonostsev went from the significance of a contract to the definition of its essence. He defines a contract as a voluntary agreement of several persons, commonly willing to determine a legal relation among them with a particular interest in mind. 41 
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The first and most notable feature of a contract corresponded to Pobedonostsev's belief in personal will as motivation for all civil law relations. The idea of an amalgamation of wills in contracts seems to be borrowed from Savigny. 42 However, it was the German adepts of classical natural law who shifted the focus to the will of the parties and broke away from the medieval scholastic allegiance to various formalities derived from the texts of Roman law. Grotius led this rebellion by declaring human will to be the source of all law, but stopped at defining contract through unilateral promise of the debtor. 43 This claim caused some inconsistency in treating a contract as a result of an agreement in Pufendorf's works, but finally was overcome by
Thomasius and Wolff in Germany and Domat in France who regarded a contract to be the result of an agreement, i.e. a combination of the wills. 44 The second remarkable feature of the notion of contract is its aim to establish a legal relation enforceable in courts, so that one party could control conduct of another to the extent agreed upon in the contract. Pobedonostsev asserted this thesis with a distinction between law as such (ius strictum) and morals (standards of behaviour unenforceable in courts) in mind. The distinction itself played an important role in the doctrines of Savigny and German Pandectists.
However, the idea of distinguishing law and moral philosophy went back to the works of Thomasius and Wolff. Both asserted that natural law was a matter of consciousness rather than law in the strict sense (ius strictum, ius perfectum, ius cogens), because it lacked enforceability. 45 The idea of economic interest at the heart of contractual relations separated Pobedonostsev's doctrine from the German views of the 19th century. Savginy and Pandectists advocated a broad concept of contract as a legal transaction which did not necessarily envisaged counter-performance. 46 Pobedonostsev's choice caused some inconsistency in his treatment of donation. He mentioned this transaction in the group of contracts to transfer property (ad dare), yet, described it in the volume on property rights without resolving the issue of its legal nature.
However, we may assume that donation was primarily a mode to acquire property right. 47 This evaluation of donation seems to be influenced by the Digest of Laws. Curiously enough, it led to some similarities with classical natural law. By rejecting many subtle but obsolete distinctions of medieval contract law in ius commune (such as, contracts iuris civilis and 14 iuris gentium, stricti iuris and bonae fidei, with or without a specific name, 'naked' or 'clothed' with a lawsuit etc.) the adherents of ius naturale in the 17th and 18th centuries made clear the criterion of mutual profitability of contracts in their doctrines. In doing so they actually suggested that a contract in its essence is a bargain, an exchange of values. Hence, the division of legal acts into onerous and gratuitous was the first in line as the most reasonable and evident. 48 Gratuitous promises or contracts were treated separately as rather falling out of the economic sense of contractual transactions. 49 Additionally, it is important to notice that Pobedonostsev used a general notion of contract in his Course that was applicable to all legal transactions matching the given set of criteria. He followed the trend in German jurisprudence which gave up various terms to label agreements in ius commune and usus modernus (contractus, pactum, conventio) in order to build the consistent hierarchy of notions (Begriffsjurisprudenz). Pobedonostsev's doctrine was somewhat inconsistent in defining donation as contract but the connection with property law was due to composition of the Digest of Laws, not to the legacy of ius commune. However, it should be noted that this general notion of contract took its shape in the works on classical natural law, when Domat, Thomasius, and Wolff overcame Grotius' and Pufendorf's emphasis on promise as the basis of contractual obligation and asserted an identity between a legal agreement and a contract.
Expounding his doctrine of contract law, Pobedonostsev took advantage of many terms which Franz Wieacker regarded as the bequest of classical natural law to German lawyers of the 19th century. 50 It can be illustrated by the content of the general part of contract law.
The General Part of Contract Law
The general part of contract law in the Course on Civil Law was almost entirely a product of theoretical jurisprudence. Pobedonostsev deplored the deficiency of Russian civil laws in this regard compared to the contemporary German and French legislation. In his view, the flaw was cause by a lack of a "classical legal education" of the drafters of these laws. This was only a partial explanation. Indeed, the civil law jurisprudence did not exist in Russia before the age of the Great Reforms of the 1860-70s. However, the mastermind behind the legislative works, 
General principles of contract law
By the 19th century contractual theory in European jurisprudence was explicitly based on general principles. In Pobedonostsev's Course on Civil Law they were not coherently expounded but invoked whenever necessary. Let us take two main principles in matters of contract law:
freedom of contract and the obligatory force of all legal agreements.
Freedom of contract
Freedom of contract is widely believed to be the cornerstone of contract law in capitalist societies because it is essential for the self-regulating behaviour of the marketplace. The roots of this principle lead to the late medieval transformation of ius commune. 52 However, it was the adepts of classical natural law 53 who popularized the secular interpretation of natural freedom of all men to enter into a contract or to abstain from it, to choose one's contracting party, to reach the mutual consent without any imposed formalities, to settle terms and conditions in a contract.
That kind of liberal ideology gained a very narrow foothold in the Russian Empire when Pobedonostsev conceptualized Russian civil law. Even the scholar himself was hostile to it.
Therefore, the principle of freedom of contract was not stated explicitly anywhere his speculations on contract law. However, a careful reader can find several essential elements of freedom of contract even in this dogmatic Course.
By mid-19th century under Russian law having the free will to enter into a contract was essential for its validity, because in any case when consent was vitiated or distorted by duress, fraud or mistake, the Digest of laws gave lawsuit for rescission of contract and for damages. 
Obligatory force of legal agreements
As in the case of freedom of contract, obligatory force of legal agreements (often expressed by Latin adage pacta sunt servanda) was disputed in medieval ius commune, but was raised to the level of a 'sacred' legal principle in classical natural law. 56 Grotius argued that even God himself could not break his promise and Pufendorf treated the 'sanctity of contract' as the basis for mutual trust within any society, or a guarantee of order and stability. 57 The functions of justice render its meaning even clearer. First, justice served the purpose to correct the rigidity in human positive law by taking into account additional circumstances relevant to the case, similar to bonae fidei lawsuits in Roman law. 64 Second, it was a means to fill gaps in Russian positive law. 65 With its meaning and functions, justice proved to be indispensable in a dogmatic discourse which contributed to similarities between the legacy of classical natural law and Pobedonostsev's Course on Civil Law. 
Conclusion

